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REAL-TIME DETECTION SYSTEM FOR SUSPICIOUS URL’S:

1

Project Description

1.1 Project Abstract
Twitter is prone to malicious tweets containing URLs for spam, phishing, and malware
distribution. Conventional Twitter spam detection schemes utilize account features such as the
ratio of tweets containing URLs and the account creation date, or relation features in the Twitter
graph. These detection schemes are ineffective against feature fabrications or consume much
time and resources. Conventional suspicious URL detection schemes utilize several features
including lexical features of URLs, URL redirection, HTML content, and dynamic behavior.
However, evading techniques such as time-based evasion and crawler evasion exist. In this
paper, we propose WARNINGBIRD, a suspicious Real-Time URL detection system for Twitter.
Our system investigates correlations of URL redirect chains extracted from several tweets.
Because attackers have limited resources and usually reuse them, their URL redirect chains
frequently share the same URLs. We develop methods to discover correlated URL redirect
chains using the frequently shared URLs and to determine their suspiciousness. We collect
numerous tweets from the Twitter public timeline and build a statistical classifier using them.
Evaluation results show that our classifier accurately and efficiently detects suspicious URLs

1.2

Competitive Information
In the existing system attackers use shortened malicious URLs that redirect Twitter users

to external attack servers. To cope with malicious tweets, several Twitter spam detection
schemes have been proposed. These schemes can be classified into account feature-based,
relation feature-based, and message feature based schemes. Account feature-based schemes use
the distinguishing features of spam accounts such as the ratio of tweets containing URLs, the
account creation date, and the number of followers and friends. However, malicious users can
easily fabricate these account features. The relation feature-based schemes rely on more robust
features that malicious users cannot easily fabricate such as the distance and connectivity
apparent in the Twitter graph. Extracting these relation features from a Twitter graph, however,
requires a significant amount of time and resources as a Twitter graph is tremendous in size. The
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message feature-based scheme focused on the lexical features of messages. However, spammers
can easily change the shape of their messages. A number of suspicious URL detection schemes
have also been introduced.
1.3 Relationship to Other Applications/Projects
To adapt to noxious tweets, a few Twitter spam identification plans have been proposed. These
plans can be characterized into record highlight based, connection highlight based, and message,
for example, the proportion of tweets containing URLs, the record creation date, and the quantity
of adherents highlight based plans. Record highlight based plans utilize the recognizing elements
of spam records and companions.
1.4

Assumptions and Dependencies

The connection highlight construct plans depend in light of more powerful elements that
malevolent clients can't without much of a stretch manufacture, for example, the separation and
network obvious in the Twitter chart. Removing these connection highlights from a Twitter
diagram, on the other hand, requires a lot of time and assets as a Twitter chart is gigantic in size.
The message highlight construct plan centered with respect to the lexical elements of messages.
Be that as it may, spammers can without much of a stretch change the state of their messages.
Various suspicious URL recognition plans have additionally been presented.
1.5

Definitions and Acronyms

Definition
Phishing: Phishing email will typically direct the user to visit a website where they are asked to
update personal information, such as a password, credit card, social security, or bank account
numbers, that the legitimate organization already has. The website, however, is bogus and will
capture and steal any information the user enters on the page.
Crawler: A crawler is a program that visits Web sites and reads their pages and other
information in order to create entries for a search engine index Crawlers are typically
programmed to visit sites that have been submitted by their owners as new or updated. Entire
sites or specific pages can be selectively visited and indexed.

Acronyms
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URL- Uniform Resource Locator
HTTP- Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTML- Hypertext Markup Language.

2

Technical Description

In this paper, we propose WARNINGBIRD, a suspicious URL detection system for Twitter.
Instead of investigating the landing pages of individual URLs in each tweet, which may not be
successfully fetched, we considered correlations of URL redirect chains extracted from a number
of tweets. Because attacker’s resources are generally limited and need to be reused, their URL
redirect chains usually share the same URLs. We therefore created a method to detect correlated
URL redirect chains using such frequently shared URLs. By analyzing the correlated URL
redirect chains and their tweet context information, we discover several features that can be used
to classify suspicious URLs. We collected a large number of tweets from the Twitter public
timeline and trained a statistical classifier using the discovered features.


We present a new suspicious URL detection system for Twitter that is based on the
correlations of URL redirect chains, which are difficult to fabricate. The system can find
correlated URL redirect chains using the frequently shared URLs and determine their
suspiciousness in almost real time.



We introduce new features of suspicious URLs: some of which are newly discovered and
while others are variations of previously discovered features.



We present the results of investigations conducted on suspicious URLs that have been
widely distributed through Twitter over several months.
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2.1

Project/Application Architecture

2.2

Project/Application Information flows

Module Description:
1. Data collection
2. Feature extraction
3. Training
4. Classification

Data collection: The data collection component has two subcomponents: the collection of tweets
with URLs and crawling for URL redirections. To collect tweets with URLs and their context
information from the Twitter public timeline, this component uses Twitter Streaming APIs.
Whenever this component obtains a tweet with a URL, it executes a crawling thread that follows
all redirections of the URL and looks up the corresponding IP addresses. The crawling thread
appends these retrieved URL and IP chains to the tweet information and pushes it into a tweet
queue. As we have seen, our crawler cannot reach malicious landing.
URLs when they use conditional redirections to evade crawlers. However, because our detection
system does not rely on the features of landing URLs, it works independently of such crawler
evasions.
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Feature extraction: The feature extraction component has three subcomponents: grouping of
identical domains, finding entry point URLs, and extracting feature vectors.
This component monitors the tweet queue to determine whether a sufficient number of tweets
have been collected. Specifically, our system uses a tweet window instead of individual tweets.
When more than w tweets are collected (w is 10,000 in the current implementation), it pops w
tweets from the tweet queue. First, for all URLs in the w tweets, this component checks whether
they share the same IP addresses. If several URLs share at least one IP address, it replaces their
domain names with a list of domains with which they are grouped.

Training: The training component has two subcomponents: retrieval of account statuses and
training of the classifier. Because we use an offline supervised learning algorithm, the feature
vectors for training are relatively older than feature vectors for classification. To label the
training vectors, we use the Twitter account status; URLs from suspended accounts are
considered malicious whereas URLs from active accounts are considered benign. We
periodically update our classifier using labeled training vectors.
Classification: The classification component executes our classifier using input feature vectors
to classify suspicious URLs. When the classifier returns a number of malicious feature vectors,
this component flags the corresponding URLs and their tweet information as suspicious.
These URLs, detected as suspicious, will be delivered to security experts or more sophisticated
dynamic analysis environments for an in-depth investigation.

2.3

Interactions with other Projects (if Any)

We compared the efﬁciency of WARNINGBIRD with that of Twitter’s detection system. For the
comparison, we sampled 14,905 accounts detected by our online WARNINGBIRD system
between September1,2011 and October 22, 2011. To compare their efﬁciencies, we measured the
time difference between WARNINGBIRD’s detection and Twitter’s suspension of the accounts.
We monitored the WARNINGBIRD to obtain newly detected suspicious accounts and then
checked the status of each account every 15 s, for one day, until it was suspended. Among the
sampled accounts, 5,380 accounts were suspended within a day; 37.3% of them were suspended
within a minute, another 44.3% of them were suspended within four hours, and the remaining
18.4% of them were suspended within a day.
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The average time difference was 13.5 min, which shows that our detection system is more
efﬁcient than that of Twitter. We also checked the status of the sampled accounts on October 28,
2011 to verify the accuracy of our system. Among the 14,905 accounts, Twitter had suspended
9,250 accounts. We then randomly selected 500 accounts from the remaining 5,655 active
accounts to manually check how suspect they were. Among the 500 accounts, 320 accounts were
suspicious. Therefore, the detection accuracy of our system given the sample data is about
86.3%.
2.4

Interactions with other Applications

Although WARNINGBIRD is suitable for detecting frequent suspicious URLs distributed by bot
accounts (which are common on Twitter[30]),we need to consider more advanced attacks using
compromised accounts . We can classify compromised Twitter accounts into two types: (i)
accounts authorizing malicious applications and (ii) accounts stolen by attackers. Twitter users
may accidently (or intentionally) authorize malicious applications luring them with interesting
advertisements, such as enticements to increase the number of their followers or notify them
regarding their unfollowers. User accounts may also be stolen by attackers guessing or stealing
their passwords. In such cases, ﬁve account similarity-based features, i.e., the number of source
applications and the similarities in the account creation dates, the number of followers, the
number of friends, and the follower-friend ratio, are no longer effective.

2.5

Capabilities


We present a new suspicious URL detection system for Twitter that is based on the
correlations of URL redirect chains, which are difficult to fabricate. The system can find
correlated URL redirect chains using the frequently shared URLs and determine their
suspiciousness in almost real time.



We introduce new features of suspicious URLs: some of which are newly discovered and
while others are variations of previously discovered features.



We present the results of investigations conducted on suspicious URLs that have been
widely distributed through Twitter over several months
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2.6

Risk Assessment and Management

Multiple redirections: Web pages can embed several external pages and different content.
Therefore, some pages can cause multiple redirections. Because our system currently only
considers HTTP redirection and does not consider page-level redirection, it cannot catch multiple
redirections. Therefore, we need customized browsers to catch and address multiple redirections.
Dynamic redirection: Currently, WARNINGBIRD uses a static crawler written in Python.
Because it can only handle HTTP redirections, it is ineffective on pages that have embedded
dynamic redirections such as JavaScript or Flash redirection. Therefore, WARNINGBIRD will
designate pages with embedded dynamic redirection as entry point URLs. This determination
causes inaccuracy in some of the feature values, including the redirect chain lengths, positions of
the entry point URLs, and the number of different landing URLs. Therefore, in the future we will
use customized Web browsers to fully retrieve redirect chains.
Coverage and scalability: Currently, our system only monitors one percent of the samples from
the Twitter public timeline, because our accounts only have the Spritzer access role. The current
implementation, however, cannot handle100%oftheTwitterpublictimeline.Therefore,we need to
extend WARNINGBIRD to a distributed detection system, for instance, Monarch [19], to handle
the entire Twitter public timeline.

3

3.1

Project Requirements

Identification of Requirements

We performed a simple investigation on three days’ worth of tweet samples culled from July 23
to 25, 2011. We extracted frequent URL redirect chains from the sample data and ranked them
according to their frequency after removing white listed domain names. Many suspicious sites,
such as jbfollowme.com, which attempts to attract Justin Bieber’s fans, proved to be highly
ranked.
We consider blackraybansunglasses.com, which is a suspicious site associated with spam tweets.
We ﬁrst encountered this site in April 2011 and it was active until August 2011. We used a one
percent of a sample of tweets collected on July 11, 2011, to conduct an in-depth analysis of the
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site . blackraybansunglasses.com has a page, redirect.php, which conditionally redirects users to
random spam pages. It uses a number of different Twitter accounts and shortened URLs to
distribute its URL to other Twitter users. According to our dataset, it uses 6,585 different Twitter
accounts and shortened URLs, and occupies about 2.83% of the sampled 232,333 tweets with
URLs. When a user clicks on one of the shortened URLs, such as bit.ly/raCz5i distributed by
zarzuelavbafpv0, heorshewillberedirectedtoaprivate redirection site, such as beginnersatlanta.tk,
which seems to be managed by the operator of blackraybansunglasses.com. The user will then be
repeatedly redirected

to

bestfreevideoonline.info and blackraybansunglasses.com.

The

redirection site blackraybansunglasses.com evaluates whether its visitors are normal browsers or
crawlers using several methods, including cookie and user-agent checking. When it is sure that a
current visitor is a normal browser, it redirects the visitor to forexstrategysite.com, which then
ﬁnally redirects him or her to random spam pages. When blackraybansunglasses.com determines
that a current visitor is not a normal browser, it simply redirects the visitor to google.com to
avoid investigation. Therefore, crawlers may not be able to see forexstrategysite.com or the
further spam pages. Another interesting point about blackraybansunglasses.com is that it uses the
Twitter Web interface. Conventional Twitter spam detection schemes usually assumed that many
spammers would use Twitter APIs to distribute their spam tweets. Advanced Twitter spammers,
however, no longer rely on Twitter APIs, because they know that using APIs will distinguish
their tweets from normal tweets. For instance, tweetattacks.com sells a Twitter spam program
that uses the Web interface to deceive spam receivers and to circumvent API limits

3.2

Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning (OAM&P)

We have provided our customers to use this project on real time basis by providing online
detection.
The online version of WARNINGBIRD uses a sliding window technique for achieving good
latency and detection coverage. A small window gives immediate results; however, it cannot
catch suspicious URLs that repeat after long-time intervals. A large window has good detection
coverage; however, its latency is bad. A sliding window is a well-known technique for taking
advantage of both small and large windows. Let w denote the window size and s denote the
sliding size(s ≤ w).Whenever a sliding window system receives s new items, it processes the
previous w −s items and the s new items at the same time. Therefore, the latency of this method
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depends on s and its detection coverage depends on w. Currently, we have set w at 10,000 and s
at 2,000. About every 12 min, the online version of WARNINGBIRD returns suspicious URLs
that have appeared
In the previous hour—near real time detection. Because our system can process 10,000 collected
tweets in less than one minute (Fig. 12), we can detect suspicious URLs with only one-minute
time lags. In addition, we could set s at 200 to detect suspicious URLs about every 1.2 min.
However, because we do not want to make our system heavily burdened, we have not use such
parameter.

3.3

Security and Fraud Prevention

Feature evasion methods: Attackers can fabricate the features of their attacks to evade our
detection system. For instance, they can use short redirect chains, change the position of their
entry point URLs, reuse initial and landingURLs, or use a small number of different domain
names and IP addresses. These modiﬁcations, paradoxically, would allow conventional detection
systems to detect their malicious URLs. Attackers may also be able to reduce the frequency of
their tweets to bypass our detection system. However, this would also reduce the number of
visitors to their malicious pages. Features derived from tweet information, however, are
relatively weak at protecting against forgery. Attackers could use a large number of source
applications and Twitter accounts, use similar tweet texts, and carefully adjust the numbers of
followers and friends of their accounts to increase the standard deviation values. In addition, they
could increase the standard deviation of their account creation date if they own or have
compromised older accounts. Although these features are weak, attackers have to consume their
resources and time to fabricate these features. Therefore, using these features is still meaningful.
The strongest evasion method is deﬁnitely to increase the number of redirect servers. This
method, however, would require a lot of resource and large ﬁnancial investment on the part of
the attackers.
Adaptation to the other services: Although WARNINGBIRD is designed for Twitter, with some
simple modiﬁcations it can also be applied to other services that can monitor a continuous URL
stream. For example, we can consider an e-mail service that continuously processes a large
number of e-mails for its users. Its operators can collect and investigate e-mails containing
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URLs. When a proper number of such e-mails are collected, the URL based features can be
extracted, such as the length of the URL redirect chain, the frequency of entry point URLs, and
the number of different initial and landing URLs. The operators can also extract other features
from e-mail context information such as the number of senders and receivers, the number of mail
servers and relay servers, and similarities in e-mail messages. Web forum services are also
similar; as their operators can collect all posts and comments of users containing URLs and can
extract URL-based features as well as other features including user IDs, IP addresses, and
message similarities. We can modify WARNINGBIRD to use the above features for detecting
suspicious URLs on those systems. A similar method can also be applied to other social
networking services such as Facebook and Google+.
3.4

Release and Transition Plan

In this paper, we propose WARNINGBIRD, a suspicious URL detection system for Twitter.
Instead of investigating the landing pages of individual URLs in each tweet, which may not be
successfully fetched, we considered correlations of URL redirect chains extracted from a number
of tweets. Because attacker’s resources are generally limited and need to be reused, their URL
redirect chains usually share the same URLs. We therefore created a method to detect correlated
URL redirect chains using such frequently shared URLs. By analyzing the correlated URL
redirect chains and their tweet context information, we discover several features that can be used
to classify suspicious URLs. We collected a large number of tweets from the Twitter public
timeline and trained a statistical classiﬁer using the discovered features. The trained classiﬁer is
shown to be accurate and has low false positives and negatives.
A number of suspicious URL detection schemes have also been introduced. They use static or
dynamic crawlers, and they may be executed in virtual machine honeypots, such as Capture-HPC
, HoneyMonkey , and Wepawet, to investigate newly observed URLs. These schemes classify
URLs according to several features including lexical features of URLs, DNS information, URL
redirections, and the HTML content of the landing pages. Nevertheless, malicious servers can
bypass an investigation by selectively providing benign pages to crawlers. For instance, because
static crawlers usually cannot handle JavaScript or Flash, malicious servers can use them to
deliver.
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4

Project Design Description

Our system consists of two Intel Quad Core Xeon E5530 2.40GHz CPUs and 24 GiB of main
memory. To collect the tweets, we used Twitter Streaming APIs [31]. Our accounts have a Spritzer
access role, and thus we can collect about one percent of all tweets from the Twitter public timeline as
samples. From April 8 to December 8, 2011 (245 days in total), we collected 59,056,761 samples of
tweets with URLs. We observed about 240,000 tweets daily on average. Our system visited all the
URLs in the tweets to collect the URL redirect chains. In addition, starting on July 23, our system
collected the IP addresses of all URLs for the domain grouping. From the collected tweets, we found
13,261,069 unique Twitter accounts. Among them, 1,339,496 accounts (10.1%) were suspended as of
January 15, 2012.
Twitter announced that it had started to wrap URLs with lengths longer than 19 characters using its
URL shortening service t.co [33] from August 15, 2011 and that it started to wrap all URLs regardless
of their length from October 10, 2011 [34]. We noticed that this additional layer of URL redirections
affects our classiﬁcation results; therefore, from August 15, 2011, we decided to remove the ﬁrst t.co
URLs in redirect chains.
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SPIRALMODEL
Labeling is essential for classiﬁcation. Unfortunately, we were unable to ﬁnd a suitable source
for labeling our datasets, as many of the URLs in our datasets have not been listed on a public
URL blacklist, such as the Google Safe Browsing API. Therefore, instead of URL blacklists, we
used Twitter account status information to label our datasets. That is, if some accounts had
posted the same URLs andTwitter suspended the account slater,we regarded theURLs as
malicious. Otherwise,we regarded them as benign. Our treatment of URLs is acceptable as
Thomas et al. have recently conﬁrmed that most suspended accounts are spam accounts.

5

Project Internal/external Interface Impacts and Specification

Since we rely on the results of Twitter’s spam account detection system to label the collected datasets,
one can argue that it just mimics the Twitter’s detection system at most. However, most of our
features are independent of the Twitter’s rules that focus on the suspicious characteristics of individual
accounts, such as aggressive following, many tweets with (blacklisted) URLs, a small number of
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followers compared to the number of followings, and frequently blocked or reported by other users.
Twitter can know whether an account violates the rules or not only after the account have performed a
series of activities. However, unlike the rules, we focus on the characteristics of URL redirect chains
and the similarity of a group of users who uploaded the same URL redirect chains; our system can
immediately check them. We also veriﬁed that our system can detect suspicious accounts that Twitter
cannot detect even several days later. Therefore, we can say that our system is not a simple mimic of
the Twitter’s detection system. Because the Twitter’s detection system had a time delay for suspicious
account detection, we checked the status information of accounts at least one month later from their
posting of tweets.
Since Twitter is an evolving system, the features of accounts and URLs on the system could change
with time. To know how they had been changed during our data collection periods, we checked the Fscores of our features in each month between May 2011 and November2011,and compared six
features that had high F-scores in some of the months. The F-scores of the similarity of account
creation dates and the relative number of initial URLs had not much changed during the months. This
is because the differences between the average feature values of them had not much changed (Fig. 11).
On the other hand, the F-scores of the relative number of source applications and the frequency of
entry point URLs had increased during the months owing to the reduced number of malicious
applications and the reduced frequency of benign URLs. We think the reasons why they reduced are
Twitter’s efforts to reduce the number of malicious applications and less sampled tweets containing
the same benign URLs due to the continuous growth of the number of tweet sit implies that attackers
had changed the characteristics of their accounts to avoid detection. two possible explanations are i)
attackers really had reduced the lengths of redirect chains because too long chains could be treated as
malicious, or ii) they had applied dynamic redirections to prevent simple static.
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6
6.1

Project Design Units Imp
Functional Area/Design UnitA

DEPLOYMENT DIAGRAM
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6.1.1

Functional Overview

User Login
Login Fail

Enter LoginID and Password

Login Success
User Home

View Follower

Normal Browser urls

View Tweets

Collect All Urls

Crawlers Urls

VIew All Tweets users

Redirect chain Urls

View Blocked Urls

Logout

.

6.1.2

ACTIVITY DIAGRAM

Impacts

The features derived from there late tweet context information are variations of previously
discovered features. However, unlike previous studies that have focused on the differences
between malicious and benign accounts, we focused on the similarity of the features of accounts
distributing the same entry point URLs. Preparing a large number of dissimilar Twitter accounts
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for distributing spam URLs becomes a burden to attackers; therefore, similarity checking is
effective.
Relative number of different initial URLs: The initial URL is the beginning URL that redirects
visitors to the current entry point URL. Attackers usually use a large number of different initial
URLs to make their malicious tweets, which redirect visitors to the same malicious URL, look
different. The number of different initial .URLs cannot exceed the number of times that their
entry point URLs appear. Therefore, if the number of different initial.Content may change prior
to final publication.URLs redirecting visitors to an entry point URL that appears n times is i, this
feature can be computed as i n.
6.1.3

Requirements

HARDWARE CONFIGURATION:Processor

-

Pentium –IV

RAM

-

512MB

Hard disk

-

80GB

SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION
Operating System

: Windows 2007

Programming Language

: JAVA

Frontend

: JSP, Servlets

Backend

: oracle11g

IDE

: my eclipse 8.6
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6.2

Functional Area/Design Unit B

Following user

tweets
worning bird

Followers

10 : view all tweets users()

4 : view followers()

8 : delete user tweets()
6 : view users follow users()

16 : detect attacker urls()

mytweets

14 : data colletion urls()
13 : redirect chain urls()
11 : normal browsers urls()

12 : crawlers browsers urls()
7 : View user tweets()
15 : domain wise urls()
5 : view followers tweets()

2 : viewtweets()

9 : posts tweet()
3 : delete tweets()
login

1 : login()

user

COLLABORATION DIAGRAM
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6.2.1

Functional Overview

User Login
Login Fail

Enter LoginID and Password

Login Success
User Home

View Follower

Normal Browser urls

View Tweets

Collect All Urls

Crawlers Urls

VIew All Tweets users

Redirect chain Urls

View Blocked Urls

Logout

STATECHART DIARAM

We used sample tweets collected between September 2011 and October 2011 to train the
classiﬁcation models and sample tweets collected during August 2011 and during November
2011 for testing the classiﬁer using older and newer datasets, respectively. From the training
dataset, we found 183,846 entry point URLs that appeared more than once in every 10,000
consecutive sample tweets. Among them, 156,896 entry point URLs were benign and 26,950
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entry point URLs were malicious. We used the LIBLINEAR library to implement our classiﬁer.
We compared seven classiﬁcation algorithms, and selected an L2-regularized L1-loss support
vector classiﬁcation (SVC) algorithm, since it shows the highest AUC and the lowest FP with the
training dataset, experimentally. Table shows the results here,LRisan abbreviation of logistic
regression, SVC is support vector classiﬁcation, AUC is area under the ROC curve, FP is false
positive, FN is false negative, L1R and L2R are L1and L2-regularized, and primal and dual
represent functions that determine termination of training. Standard deviations of the AUC were
0.0029–0.0032, those of the accuracy were 0.17%–0.20%, those of the FP were 0.05%– 0.09%,
and those of the FN were 0.18%–0.19%

Comparing classifiers within a 10- fold cross validation

6.2.2



Impacts

We present a new suspicious URL detection system for Twitter that is based on the
correlations of URL redirect chains, which are difficult to fabricate. The system can find
correlated URL redirect chains using the frequently shared URLs and determine their
suspiciousness in almost real time.



We introduce new features of suspicious URLs: some of which are newly discovered and
while others are variations of previously discovered features.



We present the results of investigations conducted on suspicious URLs that have been
widely distributed through Twitter over several months.
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6.2.3

Requirements

URL redirect chain length: Attackers usually use long URL redirect chains to make
1investigations more difﬁcult and avoid a dismantling gof their servers.Therefore,when an entry
point URL is malicious, its chain length l may be longer than those of benign URLs. Frequency
of entry point URL: The number of occurrences of the current entry point URL within a tweet
window is important. Frequently appearing URLs that are not whitelisted are usually deemed
suspicious. Suspicious entry point URLs are not usually located at the end of a redirect chain
since they have to conditionally redirect visitors to different landing URLs. Their positions are
relative to the lengths of their redirect chains. Therefore, if the position of an entry point of a
redirect chain of length l is p, this feature can be computed as p/l.
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Open Issues

Specialized – Relating to an innovative issue in the task.
II. Business process – Relating to the venture's outline.
III. Change administration – Relating to school, understudies, or ecological changes.
IV. Asset – Relating to hardware, material, or individuals issues.
V. Outsider – Relating to issues with outside plannin
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Module Description:
1. Data collection
2. Feature extraction
3. Training
4. Classification
Data collection: The data collection component has two subcomponents: the collection of tweets
with URLs and crawling for URL redirections. To collect tweets with URLs and their context
information from the Twitter public timeline, this component uses Twitter Streaming APIs.
Whenever this component obtains a tweet with a URL, it executes a crawling thread that follows
all redirections of the URL and looks up the corresponding IP addresses. The crawling thread
appends these retrieved URL and IP chains to the tweet information and pushes it into a tweet
queue. As we have seen, our crawler cannot reach malicious landing.
URLs when they use conditional redirections to evade crawlers. However, because our detection
system does not rely on the features of landing URLs, it works independently of such crawler
evasions.
Feature extraction: The feature extraction component has three subcomponents: grouping of
identical domains, finding entry point URLs, and extracting feature vectors.
This component monitors the tweet queue to determine whether a sufficient number of tweets
have been collected. Specifically, our system uses a tweet window instead of individual tweets.
When more than w tweets are collected (w is 10,000 in the current implementation), it pops w
tweets from the tweet queue. First, for all URLs in the w tweets, this component checks whether
they share the same IP addresses. If several URLs share at least one IP address, it replaces their
domain names with a list of domains with which they are grouped.
Training: The training component has two subcomponents: retrieval of account statuses and
training of the classifier. Because we use an offline supervised learning algorithm, the feature
vectors for training are relatively older than feature vectors for classification. To label the
training vectors, we use the Twitter account status; URLs from suspended accounts are
considered malicious whereas URLs from active accounts are considered benign. We
periodically update our classifier using labeled training vectors.

Classification: The classification component executes our classifier using input feature vectors
to classify suspicious URLs. When the classifier returns a number of malicious feature vectors,
this component flags the corresponding URLs and their tweet information as suspicious.
These URLs, detected as suspicious, will be delivered to security experts or more sophisticated
dynamic analysis environments for an in-depth investigation.

